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Abstract: Policy-makers have recognized that changing travel behavior is important. People, however,
do not change their behavior so readily, particularly the use of the car. A central concept that has
been invoked to account for this has been the concept of habit. However, various studies also present
people as having concrete reasons for driving: Their choices are intentional. This interdisciplinary
study attempts to reconcile these two understandings of travel behavior by drawing on insights
from the philosopher Anscombe and a growing body of travel research termed the mobility biography
literature. It applies some of Anscombe’s insights from Intention to the act of driving. With regard to
the mobility biography literature, it draws out conceptual implications both from theoretical and
empirical aspects: In particular, the characterization of travel decisions as nested in a hierarchy of
life decisions and the association of life events with changes in travel decisions. It concludes that a
broader conceptualization of human behavior leads to a broader view as to what policy-makers can
do. It reminds us that transport is ‘special’, that transport and policy are inextricable, and that the
importance of infrastructure provision should not be ignored.
Keywords: intention; habit; interdisciplinary; Anscombe; mobility biography; analytic philosophy;
transport; automobile; travel behavior; infrastructure
1. Introduction
Transportation makes up a significant share of total energy consumption and greenhouse-gas
emissions, and is dominated by the use of the private motor car [1]. Significant attempts have been
made to reduce private car use, but usage remains significant, though in some parts of the world it
is becoming less so. In other words, it has been acknowledged that it is apparently very difficult to
change people’s travel behavior or choices. Various concepts have been deployed to account for this
perceived difficulty. One is that of ‘lock-in’, with a related notion of ‘path-dependence’. The idea is
that transport is indeed ‘special’, uniquely involving as it does the investment of costly, systematic
and, crucially, sunk infrastructure. Once installed, this transport (and also land use) cannot be easily
reversed, if it can be reversed at all [2]. Related to this is the notion of ‘car-dependence’: Once a society
has been configured for the convenience of private motorists, conducting one’s life without using a car
becomes more or less impracticable; one then comes to ‘depend’ on a car [2].
What these concepts have in common is that they explain resistance to change (or inertia) by
primary reference to the external environment a person might find themselves situated in: That
within which they might try to meet their needs. Another perspective, however, focusses on the
mental, cognitive, or psychological phenomena that occur; these being internal to a person rather
than external to them, as with the built environment and infrastructure. Scholars adopting such a
perspective, recognizing that travel behavior could be properly described as a form of repetitive,
routinized activity, have invoked the concept of habit to explain why people resist changing their
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behavior. Roughly, as people repeat a particular type of behavior or action over time, it becomes
‘script-based’ [3] and automatized—an unthinking response to a given cue. Once this has happened,
actions are characterized as being undeliberative, unconscious, and akin to an impulse, though scholars
are careful not to identify habitual responses as exactly identical to impulses [4].
Such a perspective seems to be in accord with our lived experiences: Not only with regard to
driving, but other, routinised behaviors such as cleaning, exercise, and eating. However, it would seem
to be at odds with a body of scholarly literature which makes clear that people have reasons for driving
or using a car. Choice theory, for example, posits the individual as a utility-maximizing agent [5];
qualitative approaches make clear that drivers not only have reasons for driving, but are clearly aware
of their reasons for choosing the car [6].
A tension between these psychological perspectives is clearly evident. This article will pose the
research question: Is car travel behavior, as a subset of wider travel behavior and of human behavior
in general, intentional, habitual, or both? It will aim to answer this question using an interdisciplinary
approach, discussing insights from the monograph Intention of the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, as
well as a body of research which has come to be termed as, among other things, the mobility biography
literature. The concept of interdisciplinarity has been difficult to define in an easy and straightforward
way [7], and in the case of this study it cannot be defined simply and merely as using two or more
disciplines in a common intellectual endeavor. This is because the mobility biography literature cannot
be strictly described as fitting into a discipline as such: More appropriate seems the broader notion
of a field of research—or, as used elsewhere, a research ‘approach’ [8]. Huutoniemi and colleagues
have devised a helpful typology of forms of interdisciplinarity; for present purposes, their category of
theoretical interdisciplinarity appears to most appropriately describe the form of interdisciplinarity in
this paper [9]. It is defined as “synthesizing or contrasting concepts, models, or theories from more
than one field in order to develop new theoretical tools for interdisciplinary analysis. The function of
integration is to create generic links between fields, inhabit a new territory of knowledge, or establish a
new paradigm of inquiry.” (p. 84)
This article will be structured as follows: In Section 2, it will present the literature comprising
the predominant socio-psychological theoretical paradigms used to understand car use and
transport behavior, and a range of studies which apply their perspectives; it will also elucidate
counter-perspectives. Section 3 will present the philosophy of Anscombe in Intention with a prelude on
the philosopher Wittgenstein, who greatly influenced her approach to philosophy. Section 4 will draw
out relevant insights from the mobility biography literature. Section 5 will reflect on aspects of the
interdisciplinary approach. Section 6 discusses the implications of this paper’s insights and concludes
with some comments for policy-makers.
2. Literature Review: Intentional and Habitual Decision-Making
2.1. Intentional and Habitual Decision-Making in Transport and Car Travel Behaviour
The question about the positions that the concepts of intention and habit occupy in the domain of
human behavior—and, indeed, of what they even mean—has occupied scholars and researchers from
a huge range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience [10–13]. In the field of
transportation research, two perspectives have tended to predominate, informed by two tremendously
influential theoretical frameworks from social psychology: The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and
the Theory of Interpersonal Behavior (TIB).
The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB; [14]) was originally developed as the Theory of Reasoned
Action [15,16], and has a strongly rationalist conception of human behavior. It coheres with theoretical
frameworks both from economics and (neuro)psychology. It does so with regard to economics—and
particularly expected utility models—in taking it as axiomatic that people, when faced with a range of
alternatives, select one with the best behavioral consequences. People choose the best available option;
they maximize (expected) utility [5]. Such an exposition does not as such provide a psychological
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description of how people make decisions; one of the TPB’s key principles, however, does: Which is
that the immediately prior and determinative antecedent of any action is an intention, as is also argued
to be the case in psychology and neuroscience [17]. An intention is influenced by three factors: Beliefs
about the consequences of their actions, normative beliefs—normative expectations of important
reference groups or people, and beliefs about how much control they have over their action—the
efficacy with which they can translate action into results. In the specific case of transport, it would
be postulated that people deliberatively weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of each of their
travel choices, and form a conscious intention to choose the one they decide to be the best—which,
for the most part, turns out to be the car. It is hard to switch people away from the car because of its
intrinsic advantage relative to people’s deliberative calculus.
The Theory of Interpersonal Behavior (TIB) was introduced by Triandis [18]. It has a very similar
conceptual structure to the TPB; but it has two significant augmentations. Firstly, it introduces the
following constructs as additional determinants of behavioral intention: Roles (hence, ‘interpersonal’),
self-concept, and emotions. Secondly, a dynamic or temporal dimension. It agrees with the TPB that
intention precedes action, but only in situations that are new or unfamiliar. It diverges in positing
that, if the setting in which decisions are made remains stable over time, an association between goals
and behaviors is reinforced so that, eventually, the behavior becomes an automated response. On
this understanding, habits can be defined as: “goal-directed behavioural patterns which have become
sufficiently associated with specific cues as to be initiated automatically” [19] (p. 69). This does not
however mean that habitual action is reduced to the level of an impulsive reaction or a mere automatic
reflex; it is distinguished by virtue of its being undertaken to fulfil a goal (goal-directedness). Thus,
people initially make conscious, intentional choices to use the car against its alternatives, and as they
repeat using the car over time their choices cease to be intentional and become habitual. Changing car
user behavior then becomes hard because of the strength of the association between the ‘cue’ and the
automatic response.
Both the TPB and the TIB have been put forward as general theories of social behavior [20].
This, allied to their parsimonious specifications which lend them directly to quantitative modelling
techniques with relatively large sample sizes, in particular the structural equation modelling (SEM)
technique, have led them to be applied to a very wide range of domains, of which transport is only
one [5,20–25]. As applied to the particular case of car use, they have been used for various purposes.
Studies which make use of ‘pure’ TPB models (omitting habit, and presuming that only intention is to
be spoken of) examine which of the TPB constructs are most significant in influencing people’s car
use decisions; they also attempt to test the statistical ‘fit’ of the TPB to evaluate its overall explanatory
effectiveness [26–29]. ‘Habit-based’ studies might not exactly adopt the formal structure of the TIB,
but in any case also examine how important the concept of habit is in explaining and predicting car
use [3,4,30–36]; some studies have augmented the TPB to include habit as a predictive construct [37].
A very small number of studies have directly compared the TIB and TPB [20,38], or, at least, theoretical
models with different specifications, some with habit and some without [39], and have attempted to
find which framework is better at explaining behavior, again based on statistical fit. One found that
the set of constructs contained in a standalone TPB was better than habit as a variable in predicting
the mode of travel that people might choose [38]. Elsewhere, Gardner and Abraham [40] conducted a
meta-analysis of a wide range of psychological correlates of car use, and found that while variables
from the TPB had predictive utility, habit also strongly affected behavior.
From such studies, policy recommendations to reduce car use and thereby improve the
environmental sustainability of people’s travel behavior have tended to have a psychological rooting.
If the TPB’s account is accepted, changing people’s behaviors requires changing the determinants of
their behaviors: Namely, attitudes, subjective norms, or perceptions of behavioral control [41]. In the
case of the car, that might involve policy measures to alter its attractiveness relative to other modes
(e.g., increasing taxes on the car or subsidizing other sources of transport) or by persuading people
to change their values, by the use of public information campaigns [42,43]. All of those would be
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ultimately done with a view to “influenc[ing] the individual’s deliberate travel mode choice” [44]
(p. 11). If the habit-based account of the TIB is accepted, on the other hand, then to change people’s
behaviors one must not attempt to change people’s consciously chosen actions: One needs to break
their habits. This can take place in a variety of ways. One perspective is that, given that habits are
argued to be stable relative to a given context or environment, one ought to break the habit by changing
the setting in which it is repeated. This could be done by, for example, introducing economic incentives
such as pre-paid bus tickets [45]. Another suggestion has been to induce a deliberate process prior to
behavior, such as making people deliberate upon various features of their trips, such as its duration,
the amount of luggage to be carried, and the weather conditions that are likely to be experienced over
its course [33,46].
2.2. Alternative Perspectives on Habitual Behaviour
The widespread proliferation of both the TPB and the TIB appears unsurprising. Both appear to
capture apparently fundamental insights that seem unarguable and certainly strongly relevant to the
case of transport choices. Transportation choices involve costs that are significant and would surely
involve some sort of deliberation. Yet it would seem equally true that real-world choices do not involve
deliberation at each and every turn.
The predominance of these theories has prompted critiques and counter-critiques, both from
within the theoretical background and outside it [47,48]. Consequently, other scholars have sought to
suggest alternative perspectives on travel behavior. In particular, social practice theory has argued that
excessively privileging cognitive phenomena misses things out: Rather than having the deliberating,
rational individual as the focus for any inquiry into social phenomena, it would be better to use that
of a ‘practice’ and its elements [49,50]. One of its key proponents, Shove, has been critical of what
she has termed the ‘ABC’ paradigm (attitude, behavior, and choice) for understanding and affecting
environmentally-affecting behaviors, of which using the car less is certainly a part [49]. She traces
the ABC paradigm directly to ‘theories of planned behavior’, which of course includes the TPB, as
well as the TIB which built further upon it. It makes individual behavioral choice the central focus of
policy and implies that “the conceptual and practical task of [effective policy] is to identify and affect
the determinants of pro-environmental behaviour” (p. 1275). Amongst her criticisms, she says that
such a paradigm creates blind spots in identifying possible changes in practices and sustains certain
forms of governance that may make changes more difficult [49]. Elsewhere, in a study also relevant
to low-carbon mobility, Schwanen, Banister [12] also argue that existing conceptions of habit tend to
neglect the role of active agency, and argue that to understand habit one must go beyond a simple
‘Cartesian’ conception of the contemplative individual.
This research article aims to contribute to this debate, and seeks to shed light on conceptual
issues surrounding the notions of intention and habit. It will next go on to discuss the work Intention
of Anscombe, as well as a body of research in the transport literature which comes under the term
‘mobility biography’.
3. Anscombe’s Intention
Elizabeth Anscombe’s monograph Intention is arguably one of the most significant philosophical
works of the twentieth century, so much so that philosopher Donald Davidson termed it “the most
influential account of action since Aristotle.” It can be said to have effectively launched the field of
the philosophy of action. Since Anscombe’s Intention, alternative accounts of the concept of intention
have been proposed, not only including by Davidson, but also Bratman [51]. Other accounts, not only
from philosophy, but other fields like psychology and neuroscience, offer views that are congruent
with those offered by the TPB and TIB, in positing that intentions are essentially to be understood
by reference to mental or psychological processes or events. Within philosophy, ‘causalist’ views
would hold that intentions are among a number of mental items that cause actions [52,53]. Elsewhere,
Marcel notes that within psychology, there is an assumption that intentions are, by nature, conscious
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things [17,54]. For example, Wegner, while denying that intentions cause actions as such, holds that
intentions are ideas which feature in people’s consciousness right before they do what they intend [55].
Going even further, neuroscientists aim to physically pinpoint intentions to specific places in the
body’s nervous system. One study identified that “functional imaging studies of intentional actions
typically show activation in the basal ganglia and supplementary motor area” [56] (p. 190); another,
that intentions “are initially encoded in at least some of the cortical areas within the PPC [posterior
parietal cortex]” [57] (p. 695–696) (both as quoted by Mele [17]). As will be seen, such newer views
are at odds with Anscombe’s; nonetheless, interest has increasingly returned to her work, with new
scholarly attention and publications perhaps reflecting the work’s enduring insights.
Before examining Anscombe’s arguments in Intention, it will be helpful to discuss another
philosopher who had a profound influence on her: Wittgenstein. This is because Anscombe’s book is
perplexing and challenging, both in its style and organization. Based on a series of lectures, Intention
does not follow a clear, linear path: It begins with a short investigation of the concept of ‘intention’ as
such, and then, finding that fruitless, focuses on the concept of ‘intentional action’, reaching its central
and defining sentence, its definition of intentional actions: “the actions to which a certain sense of
the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive,
gives a reason for acting.” Teichman admits that this seems quite arbitrary: No justification is given for
this definition, no background explanation is given as to how she has reached this formulation, and
Anscombe says that her answer is merely suggested, rather than asserted [58].
Wittgenstein is fruitful here for two reasons; content and style. As regards the first, Wittgenstein’s
seminal Philosophical Investigations (PI) [59] contain aphoristic comments relating to intention that,
despite their cursory nature, began a huge amount of research on intentionality, indeed inspiring
such philosophers and scholars as Anscombe [60]. One of his points, relevant to the philosophy of
psychology, was that when we speak of someone intending or meaning something, we do not so by
reference to any thought-processes or ‘ostensive’ acts (mentally directing one’s attention to a given
thing). Intentional verbs thus “do not signify phenomena.” [61]. This is firstly because intentional
verbs do not have ‘genuine duration’: They:
• “Cannot take a course, unfolding in different ways.
• Cannot be spot-checked or observed continuously.
• Cannot be clocked by a spot-watch.
• [Are] neither interrupted by a break of consciousness or a shift of attention, [nor] endure
continuously” [61].
Secondly and more fundamentally, because mental or physical processes or states “are neither
necessary nor sufficient for believing, intending, or meaning something.” [61] It may well be allowed
that there are empirical correlations between such phenomena and intentional attitudes that might
inform psychologists about ‘subconscious’ or ‘unconscious’ intentions. However, as far as the concept
of intention is concerned, they do not “determine the content of intentional attitudes: what someone
intends or means.” As Hacker [60] argues: “just as willing is not a mental act or event that precedes
acting voluntarily, so too intending is not an antecedent mental act or experience (feeling, thought,
or sensation) that precedes acting intentionally.” Likewise, he argues that intention is not:
• A sensation or feeling,
• A mental act or activity engaged in,
• Thinking,
• An experience,
• An accompaniment of action.
It is simply that there is a category difference between mental phenomena and intentional attitudes
as concepts. What this means is that if the essential feature of intention is no longer held to be an
‘intentional thought’, and that of habit is held to be its absence, the putative dichotomy between
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intention and habit breaks down altogether. Stating that an action has been performed out of habit, or
as a matter of habit, does not license one to rule out that it was performed intentionally.
The second point relates to style. As earlier noted, Intention has been acknowledged as a difficult
read: It is hard to make sense of what Anscombe is trying to do and how she justifies herself. However,
when one considers Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy, this is made easier. Ultimately, being a
philosopher, Wittgenstein’s concern—and, indeed, Anscombe’s—is all about concepts. Rather than
propounding a particular philosophical theory, however, Wittgenstein is distinguished by his particular
methodological approach, the influence on Anscombe of which is clearly evident. Some elements
of this style can be described as follows. Concepts are not prior to language; language is prior to
concepts; a language is presupposed by the very existence of concepts; concepts are only possible
within language. Concepts, moreover, are tools, linguistic tools: Their meaning is in their use as tools
within language. The concepts that we use are concepts in our language, and our language just so
happens to be full of irregularities, quirks, and nuances. Any philosophical investigation into the
meaning or sense of a particular concept must therefore describe how it is used in language. The
following quote from PI (109) describes well Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy: “And we may
not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We
must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place” Wittgenstein’s approach
in PI is therefore to gain a surview or overview (Übersicht) by looking at a concept from different
perspectives [62], travelling ‘over a wide field of thought, criss-cross in every direction’ (PI, preface).
Anscombe in Intention also adopts this circumnavigatory aspect, but rather than taking snapshots
of a landscape from various angles, her approach seems more akin to tracing—defining, even—the
borders of a particular territory. Thus, in Intention, she could be said to be, painstakingly, navigating
the scope or domain of the concept of intention, with all its irregularities, singular qualifications,
awkward exceptions, and particular cases. She makes use of discrete examples case-by-case, and the
appeal to ‘wider circumstances’ in clarifying the sense of an expression. She is also happy to make
rough generalizations and to acknowledge grey areas of language, a language which, as Wittgenstein
noted in his earlier Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, has its ‘enormously complicated tacit conventions’.
However, while Wittgenstein’s account is aphoristic and for the most part negative, saying what
we can’t say about intention, Anscombe’s is positive, saying what we can. Anscombe also uses
Aristotelian conceptual architecture to buttress the notion of intentionality she propounds—a highly
un-Wittgensteinian move. Stoutland [63] summarizes as follows: “it is fair to say that Anscombe read
Wittgenstein in the light of Aristotle, and Aristotle in the light of Wittgenstein—and then went her
own way.”
One now returns to Anscombe’s formulation of intentional actions as “the actions to which a
certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of course that in which the
answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.” If this account of intentionality is accepted, then it
becomes clear that any cognitive, mental, deliberative mental processes instantaneously prior to an act
do not actually figure in intentional action. Therefore, intentionality cannot be denied to an action
performed habitually, one without a rational deliberation preceding it. Even if someone is performing
an action out of habit, not directly paying attention to what they are doing or even performing it on
auto-pilot, as long as one can subsequently ask them ‘Why?’ and they then give their reason for having
acted, their action would count as having been intentional. This would certainly seem to apply to the
case of driving the car, as observed by Gardner and Abraham [6]. In fact, Anscombe later on points
out that answers to ‘Why?’ need not be specific reasons for their corresponding actions to count as
intentional: “I don’t know” and “No particular reason” can, in some cases, be perfectly valid answers.
With reference to the earlier discussion about the TIB, actions don’t have to be goal-directed to be
differentiated from mere impulses or reflexes (someone can ‘automatically’ gaze out of the window
without a particular reason and later offer "No reason, really" as a perfectly legitimate avowal of
intentionality). Thus, intentionality and habituality (understood here in the sense of an unthinking,
repetitive, triggered response in a stable decision setting) are not antitypical to each other; this is
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because they do not sit on the same conceptual plane. In fact, far from being antitypical to each other,
they may, as far as the case of travelling by car is concerned, run in the same direction. Unreflective
habituality may in fact be the natural accompaniment of settled intentionality.
In addition, Anscombe, like Wittgenstein, argues that the mere presence of an antecedent mental
event, thought, or process is not a criterion for intention, although her argument is more general and
applies to any criterion that only concerns itself with what happens at or before the intentional action
takes place. Her arguments are different, however. One point is that intentionality is not about a
particular feature that accompanies an action which thereby distinguishes intentional actions from
non-intentional actions by their absence, in the way that two mechanically identical cars would be
distinguished by the stamp of their marques, or two switches distinguished by being on or off (i.e., the
quality of ‘intentiousness’). Her critical point is that intentionality is a form of description, and that
actions can be intentional under some descriptions and not intentional under others. For example,
John might board a train (intentional action); this might also be describable as an unintentional action
(John boarded the wrong train), an involuntary action (John’s left leg twitched while he boarded the
train), and even under a non-intentional form of description (John’s leg muscles moved in accordance
with certain electrical impulses). The point with this is that intentionality is not an ‘objective’ or
‘discoverable’ feature of an action as such: It is rather how we characterize a situation depending
on what our point of interest is of it. If we accept this, then her argument is that it could not be
some feature is as follows. If it were some feature (for example, a spasm or some electrical activity),
nothing about that feature could determine the content of the particular description of the intentional
action. It would just be by happy accident, which would be unsatisfactory: Surely we would not only
want there to be a relationship, but an effect. Her point seems to be that ‘discoverable features’ and
‘forms of description’ are in different conceptual categories, and there is no obvious way to make an
explanatorily meaningful or significant connection between them. Another way she tries to rule out
the idea that we can determine the content of an intentional action merely by referring to some feature
that ‘stamps it’ when it is taking place is to argue that, for intentionality to be meaningful, it must in
some way refer to the possibility of future action. That is, it cannot be something that can exclusively
be given content by reference to the present. One point she makes is that if we commit ourselves to
saying that what ‘stamps’ the action with the mark of intention is something that can only be found by
reference to the present (or the ‘proceedings-in-a-given’ description), then it would be impossible for
anyone who was clearly seen to say that they did not know what they were doing, without lying. If it
were not a ‘stamp’ or a ‘style’, but still was some feature of the action done at the time it was done, and
therefore without any relevance to anything taking place in the future, then we would end up with a
very thin and etiolated concept of intentionality: It would mean that, for example, there would be no
point in criticizing people for their motives.
Anscombe’s insight that an action can come under various descriptions has further relevance. She
gives the famous example of someone pumping poison in a well in order to kill some people. This
action can come under four descriptions: Pumping one’s arm up and down (A), operating the pump
(B), replenishing the water supply (C), and poisoning the people (D). All of these actions could be said
to be intentional: Yet the question arises as to which is the intention with which all these actions are
performed? Anscombe’s answer would be that it is D: The intention to poison the people; this, she
says, “swallows up” all the other intentions. The relevance of this to the case of driving would seem
to be as follows. When someone drives—say—drives to work, what they are doing can also be said
to come under various descriptions. They are physically operating the car (manipulating all of its
physical functions), they are actually driving the car, or they are, more broadly speaking, going to work.
So-called ‘activity models’ do in fact simulate and predict people’s travel patterns by making the work
or activity the basic function that people try to meet, and they schedule their trips and vehicles, etc.
based on this [64–66]. Such a view of car use and travel in general as purely being a ‘derived demand’
undoubtedly would fail to do justice to the complexity of real-life, because people do have strong
attachments to cars in their own right and may enjoy travelling in its own right [67]. Nonetheless, if
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the ‘derived demand’ case is considered, we might think that not all ‘intermediate’ descriptions of
the action need involve some process of deliberation [67]. Consider the use of tools (toothbrushes) or
obviously utilitarian vehicles like tractors and forklifts, which are no more than an intermediate means
to the broader goal. Thus, it might be perfectly reasonable not to expect the actor to have a particular
‘intentional thought’ for, at the very least, intermediate descriptions of the action (i.e., “I intend to
change gear”, “I intend to use my car today”, etc.).
What sense, then, can be made of the notion of actions that are both intentional yet performed out
of habit? Anscombe’s response would be that ‘the question does not normally arise whether a man’s
proceedings are intentional’—which is why it is frequently ‘odd’ to call them that. For example, we
would not usually say of someone that they crossed the road intentionally; yet this doesn’t mean that
this would not be an acceptable example of intentional action. Indeed, when we ask someone whether
they did something intentionally, it is usually because, for example, there is some doubt as to whether
they knew what they were doing. The default is that people act intentionally, or, as Anscombe says:
“Roughly speaking, a man intends to do what he does. But of course that is very roughly speaking”
(Section 25).
4. The Mobility Biography Literature
The second disciplinary approach through which the concepts of intentional and habitual travel
behavior will be considered is the mobility biography literature [68,69]. More properly considered
a methodological approach than a theoretical framework, it is related to the broader ‘life course
perspective’ in which “any point in the life span must be viewed dynamically as the consequence of
past experience and future expectation as well as the integration of individual motive with external
constraint.” [70] (p. 12). Central to any study of travel behavior with such an approach is the
consideration of peoples’ life courses in their entireties.
The earliest contribution particular to transport was by Salomon and Ben-Akiva [71], who
developed much of the conceptual elements and applied them to quantitative data. They deployed the
notion of a ‘life-style’, defined as “a pattern of behavior under constrained resources which conforms to
the orientations” (p. 623). According to their conceptual framework, the decisions households made in
their lives were structured hierarchically, coming into the following three categories: Life-style choices,
mobility choices, and activity and travel choices. Life-style choices were in the supreme category,
sitting at the very top of the hierarchy, and were related to such questions as to family formation,
participation in the labor force, and orientations towards leisure. Below this, mobility choices were
concerned with the choice of where to work and live and whether or not to own a car. At the bottom
of the hierarchy were day-to-day activity and travel choices, such as the decision to walk or drive to
work. Choices in each category are assumed to be made jointly with each other, and are conditional
or determined by those higher in the hierarchy, although Scheiner [72] argues that lower-category
decisions could in theory take priority over higher-category ones (for example, people with cars
have more options of where to live, and long-distance commutes are serious burdens on households;
long-distance commuters tend to change where they live or work more) and that the assumed direction
of determination might depend on what one is trying to explain.
More recent contributions to the literature have offered a more flexible and fluid approach to
studying people’s lives. They tend to be interested in the longitudinal, dynamic, drawn-out process
of life and its changes, rather than the impacts caused by, and the relationships between, life events
in discrete categories. Sattlegger and Rau [73] distinguish between ‘first wave’ studies, which take
a ‘linear-realist’ conception of life and focus on how singular events lead to behavioral changes that
people can access from memory [74–76]; and ‘second wave’ studies, which use more narrative-inductive
approaches and acknowledge that ‘mobility practices and their complex and interrelated changes
over lifetime’. Some outright reject the idea that these categories or domains in life are hierarchically
related to each other [8], implying that general values and imaginaries of the good life—expressions of
top-level ‘life-style’ aspirations—need not always change for mobility decisions to be altered. Others
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recognize how they are complex and interrelated, how clear-cut chains of decision-making may not
always manifest themselves in practice, “and that slower, long-term processes of change . . . may have
onsets cannot be easily pinned to a specific event or occasion” [73] (p. 23).
For the most part, this paper uses Salomon and Ben Akiva’s framework, though principles and
insights from the mobility biography literature considered more broadly may certainly have application.
In any case, without touching directly on intention and habit themselves, it becomes clearer that their
framework implies a rather different and more complex picture of intention, deliberation and action
than the linear TPB and TIB models. Instead of the solitary, discrete, standalone, and determinate
travel choice made in isolation, people could in some sense be said to be making choices between
configurations of life styles which might have some indeterminate outcomes. Thus, it is not as such a
question of mode choice on an individual basis; it could be, for example, between Job A, House X, and
a seasonal railway ticket, and between Job B, House Y, and a car. Indeed, even travel decisions are not
to be considered in isolation of each other: In particular, the adoption decision and the daily usage
decision may affect each other (people’s choice of car may depend on their current travel mileage,
and how their mileage changes in the future may depend on the car they eventually choose to get),
reflected in travel forecasting studies which use simultaneous equation modelling techniques [77,78].
People do not, as such, make travel choices standalone: These choices are conditional on actually
having adopted a car (or having purchased a travel card) in the first place—rather related to the notion
of path dependence, where an initial commitment may condition subsequent choices [2]. Another
point to make is that of a very different relation between intentional thought, and deliberation, and
action. It is probably reasonable to surmise that people do not necessarily have clear intentions of what
sort of life styles they want; indeed, of what jobs they want and how they will then make their travel
choices. They may take much time deliberating over what they really want before taking action.
As regards its methodological rootedness in the person’s entire life course, it implies that we
should expect travel behavior to be in some sense habitual anyway; some scholars in this field of
research have explicitly agreed that travel behavior best comes under that description [69]. The nature
of life and its rhythms: Daily life, quotidian life—should be expected to be routine. Insofar as transport
decisions are considered to be a subset of life decisions and are to be made in conformity to its dictates,
we should indeed expect them to exhibit the very regularity and routineness we would find in the
rhythms of life [79]. Psychological processes and deliberation are not actually that central, and should
not be expected to be that central, to the question of day-to-day car usage as such.
Another implication which seems to emerge and which mirrors something previously discussed
is that travel is for the most part a derived demand, being dependent on the higher-order life decisions.
In short, transport is a means to other ends. It then could be said to make it reasonable to call travel
behavior both intentional and habitual in a similar way to Anscombe, just in a way that is explicitly
applied to transport. In one sense, yes, they did drive to work, but the relevant choice might have been
for the place of work. Taking the chain of ‘Why?’ questions even further, as with Anscombe, one might
find answers such as: ‘To support my family’/‘It was just the job I needed’ etc., with the car use being
merely a resultant given.
Another insight that appears to emerge from this framework is that a household can be in a position
where they appear constrained, ‘locked-in’, and do not have any reasonable transport alternatives to
the car, but that this is because of rational choices and, indeed, voluntary commitments, not because of
a constraining or coercive force of habit. Indeed, this recalls back the definition of “a pattern of behavior
under constrained resources”. Some recent research has examined the phenomenon of ‘transport
poverty’, wherein households do not have a ready or viable alternative to the car, even if it means using
significant shares of their income on travel alone, to the detriment of their welfare [80]. Nonetheless,
the nature of the household decision-structure, with the long-term life-style choices, and medium-term
mobility choices, implies that households will indeed make substantial, costly, commitments which
may be difficult if not impossible to reverse, but which are nonetheless rational, intentional, and
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wanted. In other words, how people might perform travel behavior routinely and unreflectively, ‘resist’
change away from this routine, and yet would agree that they do it intentionally.
Related to the previous point is the idea that intention, or, indeed, commitment, may long precede
the action or series of actions that may take place. For example, someone may accept a job position
which starts twelve months later and which also involves a significant relocation away from their
existing home. They envisage a long commute and prepare to buy an economical diesel commuter.
Thus, in the interim, they continue commuting with their existing petrol-powered car; as the job move
approaches, they eventually sell their petrol and commute by electric bike as a stop-gap measure.
Finally, they make the move and commute by car every day without really thinking of it. This
repetitive, unconscious behavior would probably be reasonably described as a travel ‘habit’, but it
took place without any repetitive build-up and no particular deliberation or intentional thought need
have preceded the act of driving. Thus, intentional thought is not necessarily to be expected. It must
however be pointed out that no single action need have been ‘determinately’ performed [12].
A final point is that having a view of habit which includes intentionality (or, at the very least, does
not exclude it) means that we have a different understanding of what might be involved in behavior
change. The idea of habit being anti-intention, or an anti-correlate of intention, or beyond the field of
intention, or of intention fading away as habituality secures its stronghold, has implied that, essentially,
one must fight impulse with impulse. It presents a rather passive picture of people, as effectively being
inertial automata who must be acted upon from outside, without consideration of their life plans and
projects. The change of external circumstance, or an external ‘shock’ or ‘nudge’ is what is proposed
to change people’s behaviors [81]. If, however, we accept the hierarchy of life choices as reasonable,
then actually the truth is that intentionality and rationality never really leave: In that people might be
expected to have some idea of what they want with their lives, however vague, even if they are not
reflective of them at every instant. The mobility biography literature has found ‘life events’, such as
changing a job or having a child, to be associated with the number of cars in a household [82,83]. Life
events are then proposed as causing behavior change, or as windows of opportunity to encourage
behavior change. However, an alternative interpretation which bears intentionality in mind is rather
that the people themselves ‘originated’ the life event, such as the child birth or change of house or
job—and then changed their travel behavior (although it need not always be the case—e.g., someone
being forced to move house). That is, apparent changes in habits do not happen with intentionality
absent from the picture, changes were not necessarily due to external actings upon people, but could
have been because of the person’s very own intentions (they originate from the people themselves).
As another example, the London Olympics, an unplanned-for ‘shock’ which cannot be reasonably
said to have figured in household’s rational life plans, did result in changes in travel patterns, but
most households reverted back to their usual travel patterns, reflecting perhaps their longer-term
conceptions and intentions about what sort of lifestyle they might have wanted [84] (this does not
however mean they needed to have explicitly posed themselves this question, nor that they must have
conceived of their ‘lifestyle’ as a single, unitary thing).
5. On Interdisciplinarity: A Reflection
This section reflectively discusses what is was like to perform interdisciplinary research, drawing
from two quite different fields.
One difficulty involved was getting to grips with Intention itself, which is acknowledged as obscure
and challenging even by specialists. This was helped by the growing secondary literature, and also by
simply taking the time to read (and re-read) it slowly and patiently. Defining the limits of what was to
be discussed was also difficult, because diverse points of discussion seemed frequently to emerge. It is
noted that methodologically, this paper did not go into great depth with the concept of habit—and did
not attempt to define it as such. It is felt that this was justified, as it seemed the treatment of intention
was also justified, and Wittgenstein’s brief mentionings of ‘habit’ in PI seems simply to take for granted
that the meaning of habit is to be understood depending on the circumstances. This is in fact the point
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that his notion of ‘family resemblance’ makes: A given concept or term can have various senses which,
like members of a family, may have certain similarities and differences. Thus, a driving habit is to be
contrasted with a smoking habit, an exercise habit, etc. At any rate, a full conceptual investigation is
beyond the scope of this paper.
One surprise was how relatively smooth a transition was to be had from a discussion of Anscombe
to the mobility biography literature, and how Anscombe’s insights could be interspersed into arguments
relevant to the mobility biography literature, supporting points made. Rather unexpectedly, it was felt
that both disciplines had two common features.
Firstly, they paid attention to people’s lived lives as such (or, in Anscombe’s case, their lived
languages). The mobility biography literature, of course, is by nature and definition focused on people’s
lives. In the case of Anscombe, as noted earlier, while she does not totally replicate Wittgenstein’s
approach to philosophy, she is far from uninfluenced by it. As far as go the matter of lived lives, or
lived languages, her approach acknowledges that language is first and foremost a tool that is used in
people’s lives. Thus, she is happy to recognize that language is messy and not always clear-cut. She also
uses everyday examples to illustrate her points (e.g., shopping lists, routine conversations), rather than
pursuing abstract definitions and essences. It is incidentally to be noted, following Foucault [85,86],
that when matters of language and life are involved, there are always, potentially, questions about
discourse and power, which might determine the articulation, manifestation, or materialization of
language and truth. This is to say that meanings and expressions within language itself might be
said to be determined by power-conflicts between agencies. If such a view is allowed, the meaning
of language and its various interpretations cannot necessarily be taken for granted; categories of
language whose boundaries are blurred might be subject to continual negotiation or dispute, and it
may be latent power structures which finally settle their in-fact articulations. To undertake an in-depth
analysis of the issues would be beyond the scope of this paper, but various relevant applications can be
sign-posted, for example in the case of ‘infrastructure as text’ [87] and environmental policy-making
more broadly [88–92].
Secondly, neither approaches were strictly theoretical, distinguishing themselves by their
methodological features, with the mobility biography literature giving a concrete application to
the transportation context. This may explain why it was felt that coherence was possible when these
two perspectives were combined (nonetheless, the term theoretical interdisciplinarity is used in place
of the equally available methodological interdisciplinarity [9] to describe the form of interdisciplinarity
present in this paper, because the focus here is on concepts rather than methods. It is simply how they
are named within that particular typology).
It should also be noted that the argument of this paper is not that deliberative behavior in travel is
not, as such, bereft of any interest, or does not merit any further study or investigation: Deliberative
behavior may become more important in the future, because of the advent of Mobility as a Service
(MaaS), where it is conceived that people face a menu of travel mode choices on a single (electronic)
platform. It is conceivable that people in the future would deliberate over their options. The point is
that as far as the concept of intention goes, deliberation or thought prior to action is not a criterion for
calling an action intentional.
6. Conclusions
This paper posed the research question: Is car travel behavior, as a subset of wider travel behavior
and of human behavior in general, intentional, habitual, or both? To answer this question, it used
an interdisciplinary approach to examine the concepts of intention and habit as have been deployed
in transportation research, drawing on the philosophy of Anscombe in Intention and the mobility
biography literature. It has argued that it is reasonable to speak of behavior in general, and (car) travel
behavior in particular, as being intentional and also habitual, and gave illustrative examples of the
senses in which this might be said to be the case.
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Although this purely conceptual point might seem to be a distinction without a difference, its
significance appears to be far from trivial. A minor point is that by eschewing a strict dichotomy
between intention and habit, we have a logically consistent basis for keeping the doors open to policy
interventions which presuppose that human behavior is described by either one of those concepts.
Thus, we prevent ourselves from ruling out certain policy interventions which would be irrelevant if
we argued that the concepts were mutually exclusive. There is however a deeper point. To deny of
an action that it is intentional has broader logical consequences than immediately apparent. Without
intentions, there are no reasons. Without reasons, we cannot speak of persuading people, appealing to
their interests, objectives, and goals. We are led to an image of passive inertiality, wherewith people
can only be changed from the outside, be it by their being transplanted into a new setting or by a
colliding impulse which jolts them off their preordained and predestining path. This leads to the
collapse of agency that Schwanen et al. have critiqued [12].
An even broader point has been made here than merely to challenge the dichotomy: It is a
challenge of what might be termed a Cartesian picture of total mental priority, which restricts one into
such narrow conceptual categories. Its view, in sum, is that mental events, activities, and processes
have total priority as far as explanation and conceptual clarification goes. Or, if you want to know
what is going on, you have to, first of all, look inside people’s heads. This leads to the narrowness of
which Shove and Schwanen, amongst others, have raised issues with [12,49], and has meant that policy
recommendations for changing behavior have tended to focus only on interacting with the psychology
of the individual. In particular, an excessively cognitive focus (i.e., on mental phenomena and
processes), and choosing a picture of a contemplative agent presented with a menu of options, would
seem to mean focusing on ‘instrumental-hedonic’ attributes, such as cost, speed of travel, comfort [93].
These are agential attributes, framed by reference to first-person psychology and motivation. And,
crucially, because they are framed in terms of the first-person perception or evaluation of the travel
choice, they do not directly relate to things in the broader picture which in particular the mobility
biography framework brings out: Jobs, housing, and, crucially, the transport infrastructure mentioned
at the very beginning of this article, which might all be said to have their equivalents in the ‘materials’
of Shove’s social practice theory [50]. If one now considers that people make whole-life choices, that
housing might supersede transport in importance, that these sort of choices might involve some sense
of long-term, relatively irreversible commitment and that these choices are certainly intentional, though
not in the same way as other choices, then the importance of infrastructure emerges clearly, in a way
that it doesn’t with more mentalist perspectives [49]. That is, if one focuses only on the picture of the
individual person making the travel decision and the co-occurrent psychological activities or processes,
it simply is not straightforward to account for how important people’s wider life choices, such as
where to live and work, are in shaping or having shaped those decisions. One might even say that a lot
of the instrumental-hedonic attributes are in fact derivative of the extent of the infrastructure, and
certainly not the other way around: Infrastructure (which actually need not be limited to transport
infrastructure, but could include the entire gamut of housing and land use) has explanatory priority.
Due to the systematic, non-linear, and layered nature of infrastructure, however, it is difficult to focus
the node of explanation of transport actions to a single point; and that is certainly not the aim of
this paper.
Once infrastructure is allowed its due importance, the responsibility of policy becomes apparent. As
transport economists recognize, transport is ‘special’: Like energy, it exhibits peak and off-peak demand,
network effects and constraints, and, crucially, it depends on infrastructure for its provision [94]. Insofar
as the extent of infrastructure provision has remained mostly the prerogative of policy-makers—again,
not only including roads and railways, but housing and other buildings—transport is utterly inextricable
from policy. In the United Kingdom transport sector, for example, despite privatization and a very
complex governance network of actors and groups, it is ultimately public bodies who have the hard
authority and power to decide what actually gets built and how much money gets spent [95]. This is
not only the case in transport, but in broader domains of responsibility which overlap with and affect
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it, like land use [96] (for the particular case of parking, which very clearly relates both to transport and
land use, see [97]).
A mentalist conception of decisions, insofar as it obscures this importance of wider infrastructure
via its focus on agential deliberation, therefore understates the importance of this issue, concentrating
on relatively smaller-scale actions that center on the agent’s psychology. An historical assessment will
reveal that the role of policy in infrastructure, and transport more widely, has been far from passive or
inert: It has been contingent, deliberate, and, if this word be allowed, intentional [98]. It is not by any
means suggested that there are easy answers to the problems in transport, but by casting a light on
the importance of infrastructure in addition to discrete individual motives as such, it is hoped that
policy-makers will be encouraged to take a broader view of possible remedies.
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